Israeli troops have investigated Hamas He was able to attack the Israeli terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, as the many more powerful Israeli army made a mistake in the arms of the armed group and underestimated its capabilities.

“A large-scale, surprise attack has not been considered a possible scenario because of the fundamental misunderstanding of the enemy,” said the military, who were published on Thursday. “IDF and intelligence agencies perceived Hamas as a limited and reactive threat and assumed that early warning would precede any large-scale offensive.”

Foundations can put pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to start a widely demanded wider issue to study the terrorist attack, which has caused a terrorist attack War in GazaA number

The Prime Minister did not take responsibility for the Israel strategy for the attack, saying that he would answer tough questions only after the war, which was suspended for about six weeks. ceasefireDespite the public pressure, including about 1,200 people killed in the October 7 attack, 251 as Gaza, Gaza, Netanyahu resisted the calls of the interrogation committee.

The main results of the military were that the most powerful and complex military in the region miserably said the intentions of Hamas were underestimating its opportunities and completely absurd armed militants' surprise attack.

In the comments made by military commanders on Monday, the media spread through the army's chief of staff, General Herzi Halloween that he was responsible for the failures of the army.

“I was a military commander on October 7, and I have my own responsibility. I also carry the weight of all your responsibilities, I also see it as my resignation.

The conclusions of the military are in line with the conclusions of officials and analysts. The soldiers only published the summary of the report, and military officials outlined its revelations.

“October 7 was a complete failure,” said the Military Officer of Associated Press, who spoke about the condition of anonymity in accordance with the regulations.

The central misconception was that Hamas, which captured Gaza's control over the Palestinian authority in 2007, was more interested in managing the area than the fight against Israel.

The soldiers also made a mistake of Hamas's opportunities, a long time appointed a terrorist group by the US and Israeli governments. Military planners planned that the worst, Hamas could stage a land invasion up to eight border units, the Military Officer said. In fact, Hamas had more than 60 attack routes.

The consequences of the attack showed that Hamas was close to staging the insult on three early occasions, but postponed for unknown reasons, the official said to the AP.

The official also said that the attack took place, there were signs that something was a month, including the Hamas fighters changed their phones to the Israeli network.

The perception that Hamas does not want the war decided to make decisions that were far away that could disrupt the attack.

“Faith was that Hamas could have influenced pressure that would reduce its motives for the war, mainly improving the conditions in the Gaza Strip,” the report said in a summary of the report. “Israel's policy towards Gaza was based on defense, stabilization and efforts to prevent HAMAS military construction, a direct conflict (ie days) preparation of the scenario of escalation.”

Israeli Military Officer told AM that intelligence shows Yahiah Sinar, October 7, attack killed in October last yearstarted to plan it at the beginning of 2017.

With the weekend's exercise guard, Hamas has launched a hard wave of missiles, which allowed thousands of warriors to explode through a security fence or hang on glides. They knocked on the control cameras and quickly suppressed hundreds of soldiers located along the border.

From there, they advanced the main intersections of the highway and attacked the area, including the same senior officers, preventing the military command and control, which also said on the condition of anonymity.

After the first three hours of the attack, Hamas fighters resisted a little resistance through the border communities and the music festival. It was when most of the 251 hostages were taken, and most people were killed, the official said to AP. The official says that chaos led to friendly fire incidents, although he said that many were not without the figure.

For the soldiers, it is necessary to restore control and days until the area is fully cleansed of militants.

According to the first official, the report accused the armed forces to be superior to its knowledge and in its basic concepts and beliefs. The summary says it was a key lesson that Israel could not afford to develop its border.

It addressed several suggestions, including the creation of special subdivisions, which are planned to prepare for such surprises, as well as the reform of the Faculty of Military Intelligence, which will stimulate the “openness, skepticism, listening”.

It was not guilty of any individual soldiers or officers, but it would probably be directed to calculate the military and final dismissal.

In addition to Halev, other high-ranking officers have also resigned, including former head of the military intellect.